Public Statements 2008
"The Balkan Peninsula: The Present and the Future"
Remarks by DCM Countryman
Diplomacy Magazine 5th Annual Conference:
South Eastern Europe - Balkans
Athens, Greece
April 14, 2008
I want to build on two things that [Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman George Koumoutsakos] said. First, I agree there are more reasons for optimism than pessimism in this region of the Balkans: it is still Balkan, it is still difficult, it is not uniquely difficult in the world, nor is the future necessarily dark no matter how complicated some of the issues are. And second I liked very much his line in which he said it’s necessary to overcome certain stereotypes of the past.
And let me begin there to talk about Kosovo because one of the common stereotypes that I have encountered in parts of this region is that everything that happens in the Balkans is the result of a grand design by the United States in pursuit of its imperialist interests. The US is deeply involved in Kosovo and has been actively engaged over time to bring stability and peace in the area for more than 15 years, but never, never, never, unilaterally.
Since 1999, we have worked closely within the Contact Group in order to help the United Nations to fulfill the twin tasks of Resolution 1244: to administer Kosovo, and to prepare for a resolution of its status. The Contact Group includes, to this day, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the United States. And all important decisions as to the policy that we would follow together were taken by consensus within that group up until very recently. This is the group that encouraged the United Nations to pursue a negotiation process under a very distinguished statesman, Marti Ahtisaari, in pursuit of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina that could arrive at a good solution for the future status of Kosovo. When those negotiations led nowhere, which was the conclusion that Mr. Ahtisaari, not the United States, not the Contact Group made, when those negotiations were unsuccessful and reached an impasse that could not be breached, Mr. Ahtisaari prepared his own proposal for the United Nations as to how to proceed from this point.
And it is that plan that is currently being implemented. I agree with my Russian colleague that ideally it would have been implemented by the United Nations Security Council and brought into being in that way. That was not possible, although majority of the members of the Council supported implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan.
Today the decisions on Kosovo are being made by the people of Kosovo. They need the support of the international community. They are getting it from the United States, but they are not getting it unilaterally from the United States. The policy that we pursue is identical to the policy of Britain, France, Germany and Italy. With regard to what has occurred in the last year in Kosovo, and what we will do in the future, we have even gone to the point of placing under the supervision and command of the European Union our own officers, including police officers and other officials, for the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. This is not unilateral action. This is cooperative.
I understand how difficult it can be for the European Union to get to an absolute consensus on every point regarding Kosovo. And I respect the points of view of those who disagree. I respect very much the Russian point of view, and the reasons that led Russia to withdraw from the consensus of the Contact Group more than a year ago. And I respect the reasons that Greece and others have not yet recognized the independence of Kosovo.
But the majority of European Union members have. They didn’t do it because of United States pressure or grand design from the United States. They did it because they agreed with us that the alternative of doing nothing, of letting the impasse continue forever, was more likely to bring instability rather than stability to this region that we all agree is important.
I cannot underestimate or overestimate how difficult this is for my friends in Serbia. My late father-in-law, the father of my wife, was a Serb from Kosovo. I think if more people in Kosovo had been like him, we would not have ever gotten to the point that we did reach in the 1990s. Regardless, I know that neither the U.S. nor any of the European Union nations that we cooperated with in the Contact Group can give advice to Serbia, or to individual Serbs, about how they should feel. There is a great feeling of sympathy. And I am not one who can tell you that the Ahtisaari Plan is the most perfect constitution that man has ever drafted. But I can tell you my deep personal belief even taking into account that Serbia is a country I know and love as much as any other, that this is the least bad plan. This is the best alternative for the future of the region, including for Serbia. I don’t ask them to agree and I can’t impose that thought on any of my Serbian friends; I can only give it to you as something very personal and sincere.
The vision that we should have of Serbia, as we’ve already heard several times today, is one that this proud, economically strong country, takes its rightful place as a full member of the European Union, and that is a goal that we should aim for; it’s a goal for all of the region and it’s within grasp of the countries of the region, as they are prepared to reach out for this goal.
Entry into NATO has been a powerful force for making necessary reforms in all the countries of the region and in the wider area of Eastern Europe. It has helped countries to make very difficult political and economic reform choices that they could not have made without the incentive of NATO membership. And I would be the first to acknowledge that the process of European Union accession, stabilization and harmonization is even a more powerful force for driving states towards the necessary reforms that they need to make if they are going to be the best neighbors and best business partners and most respectful of their own people, the goals that we have for this entire region.
In this sense, we had hoped that before the Bucharest NATO Summit we would be able to see an expansion by three members, Croatia, Albania, and as we say in NATO terminology, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We were disappointed that the talks between Greece and Macedonia did not progress to a point that made it possible for all three countries to be admitted in Bucharest. As to the outcome of the Bucharest Summit: we were disappointed, and let me say disappointed, not angry. I don’t know anybody in the U.S. government who was either angry or surprised at the outcome of the Bucharest Summit on this issue. But, yes, disappointed, because we do believe that inclusion of Greece’s northern neighbor in NATO is important to regional stability and important to the interests of the people of that country.
There was of course a positive outcome on this issue in Bucharest, that is, a consensus among all NATO members that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has met the technical criteria for inclusion in the Alliance. And a restatement of the desire of all members of NATO to see that happen as soon as possible and to encourage the two parties to move rapidly toward goal. And that’s where we are today.
Now that this is a NATO goal, as well as a stated goal of the two governments, we’ve seen a restatement from both capitals of the desire to begin rapidly. We’ve seen the intention of the leader of this process, the United Nations special negotiator Matthew Nimetz, to consult with the two parties, even this week, in order to decide how to proceed. And as a consequence the United States, as an old ally of Greece, as a new friend of the Republic of Macedonia and hoping to see them as a future ally, and as a NATO member, in support of what is now a stated NATO goal, at the request of both parties, with the encouragement of Ambassador Nimetz, we are consulting closely with our ally here and our friend to the north, as to the best way forward on this issue.
We cannot, we will not replace or supplant Ambassador Nimetz as the leader of these negotiations. We have no mandate to do so. We have no intention to do so. But we will help both friends think through the process of how to move forward. What needs to be changed in the negotiating process, what needs to stay the same, whether it is desirable for them to have a timeline for negotiations. These are not decisions for Washington. They are decisions to be taken by the mediator with the two parties. But because both parties value our point of view, we will continue to consult quietly.
Now, I know that is not an easy negotiation. In 25 years in diplomacy, I have to say I’ve never seen an issue of this complexity successfully negotiated through the mass media. It is important that the sides, the two parties, find a way of speaking to each other with confidence and with goodwill and with respect for the viewpoints of the other that can result in an outcome that all the rest of the world will applaud.
Skopje and Athens will get from the United States and from other NATO allies support and encouragement. Skopje and Athens will get from Ambassador Nimetz and the United Nations process ideas and the framework for negotiation. The will, the determination to find a solution cannot come from New York or from Washington; it can only come from Athens and from Skopje. We’ll do everything we can to support it.
I realize there are many more pieces of the Balkans than I’ve talked about. But I think these are the two most important issues. The situation in Kosovo, yes, it’s dangerous, it’s certainly not the only country in the region that has a problem with corruption and with organized crime, but it is not a place where the US is pursuing a unilateral foreign policy. We’re in close cooperation with leading members of the EU and we’ll stay there. And in resolving the difficult name issue between our ally and our friend, you can count on the support of the United States, but not the substitution of the United States for the process that’s underway. Thank you very much.